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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the intertemporal consumption/savings decision when
income follows a random walk with drift and the drift coefficient is unknown.
Instead agents are Bayesian learners, combining prior and sample information
to form a posterior for the drift coefficient and future income. This
parameter uncertainty increases by an order of magnitude the uncertainty of
future income over that generated by unknown future shocks to income and can
lead agents to have much more precautionary savings and hence to accumulate
more wealth than otherwise. In a calibration exercise it is shown that for a
plausible specification of the level of prior information and real interest
rate, that the level of aggregate wealth due to this parameter uncertainty
could be larger than that generated by unknown future shocks to income,
the latter of which has been estimated elsewhere to potentially account for
60 percent of US aggregate wealth.
Keywords: Permanent Income Hypothesis, Precautionary Savings, Parameter
Uncertainty, Bayesian learning, Wealth Accumulation.1. Introduction:
In most permanent income models of consumption agents are assumed to
know the parameters of the stochastic process generatlng income (see for
example Caballero. 1991. Deaton. 1991. Skinner. 1988 and Zeldes. 1989). This
means that in these models the only source of uncertainty for agents is that
of unknown future shocks to income.
If for example. as in Caballero (1991) income Is assumed to Iollow a
random walk with drift coefficient of say~. then future income is uncertain
because agents do not know if over the course of their lifetime they will be
getting a series of above or below average increases in income (i.e. future
shocks) around a known average income increase of ~.
The parameter ~ can naturally be thought of as a proxy for skill levels
that are acquired either through nature or nurture. Lucky agents who draw a
high ~ will have on average higher income growth over their lifetimes than
agents who draw low values of ~. There i~ obviously considerable variation in
~ across the population and the educational system is at least partly
designed to provide workers and employers with information about the skill
levels and hence ~ that particular workers have been allocated. However. it
seems at least plausible that when an agent enters the workforce. that there
wi11 still exist considerable uncertainty about the ~ that he has been
allocated and that this parameter uncertainty could be the dominant source of
uncertainty vis-a-vis future income. Thus the question of whether someone
just finishing law school Is a brilliant. average. or below average lawyer
could easily be responsibIe for more uncertainty about future income than
whether the pay raises relative to h~ or her particular skill level will beabove or below average.
This notion that uncertainty about 11 is more important that unknown
future shocks to .income 1s derived formal.ly in the paper. In particular 1t is
shown that whereas when J1 Is known the condit tonal forecast variance of
future income increases linearly with the forecast horizon, when 11 is
unknown it increases with the square of the horizon. Thus given a long enough
horizon an unknown 11 will be responsible for more uncertainty about future
income than unknown future shocks.
The paper then examines the implications of this higher order
uncertainty for precautionary savings and wealth accumulation. Given a convex
marginal utility of consumption function, the additional uncertainty stemming
from an unknown ~ will increase the incentive agents have to hold
precautionary balances and hence to accumulate wealth. Estimates in Caballero
(1991) and Skinner (1988) are that precautionary savings due to an unknown
future shocks to income could account for up to 60 percent of US wealth.
Since an unknown J.l can potentially generate more uncertainty about future
income, one might expect it to be an important I perhaps more important,
factor in explaining precautionary savings and wealth.
In the paper I separate aggregate wealth accumulation due to unknown
future shocks and unknown p.. For the model I consider the relative importance
of these two components of aggregate wealth depends only on the rate of
interest and the amount of prior information agents have on ~. I show that
for plausible parameter values that the amount of aggregate wealth
accumulated because of an unknown ~ can easily be of comparable magnitude to
that due to unknown future shocks. Thus the paper argues that learning and
parameter uncertainty may play an important factor in explaining savings and
2o ;,: 0
wealth.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 of the paper I examine
the uncertainty of future income when I! is unknown and show that there are
potentially very large welfare gains from precautionary savings. Section 3
then deals with the intertemporal consumption/savings decision when 11 is
unknown. In Section 4 the effects of future shocks and unknown 11 on aggregate
wealth are examined and their relative importance assessed using a
calibration exercise. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks.
2. The Uncertainty of Future Income and its Velfare Costs:
Ccnsider an agent liVing for T+lperiods t=0.1.2,...T. At age t the
household's utility is:
Trt -OT
1) Vt = Et L U(Ct+T)e
T=O
where the felicity function is assumed to exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion:
2) U(C) = -exp(-6C)/6 6 > O.
The income of the household Yt follows a random walk with drift:
To begin the discussion assume for the moment that 11 is known (I wi 11
assume that ,l is known for the entire paper) so that the only source of
uncertainty are future shocks to income at. In this case since
k
4) Yt +k = Yt + k 11 +j~lat+j
Yt +k differs from its forecast Yt+kll because of the sum of the k future shocks
3at +j j=l,2....k. Consequently the conditional forecast variance is:
2
Vart[Yt+kl = ~ k,
which grows linearly with the horizon k and the distribution of Yt +k
conditional on the information set at time t is:
Now consider the case where ~ is unknown but is instead randomly drawn
by nature or nurture from some probability distribution. At t=O, the
beginning of their productive lives, individuals have prior information about
their ~, which I will denote by Po' given by:
• 2
6) ~ - N[~o' ~ol.
An alternative way of expressing the prior variance, which is more convenient
for our purposes, is to define t =~2/~2 and express 6) as o 0
Since this is a conjugate prior it is equivalent to observing an additional
sample of size to with sample mean ~o'
An example of the source of this prior information could be the
educational system which, by testing the skill levels of future workers and
to some extent simulating the work environment, provides both workers and
employers with information about the ~ that a particular worker has been
allocated. In this context to could be interpreted as the equivalent number
of work years of experience that the educational system provides while ~o
would be the educational system's assessment (or estimate) of the
individual's ability level or ~.
Once the agent begins working he wi 11 observe his past and present
income history and use this information to learn about ~. Denote this
sample information at age t as Set) where:
4Since ~Yt is independent and normally distributed with mean ~ and
variance rr2 , the posterior for ~ comes from standard Bayesian results (see
Box and Tiao, 1973 for example) and is:
8) J1 I S(t)'po"rr2 N[ ~t ' rr2/(t+to)]
where the posterior mean Il
t is:
8') Ilt = ~t-l + [~Yt - ~t_l]/(t+tO)
or
8") ~t ~t + to~o-~t]/(t+to)
and where ~t=(Yt-Yo)/t is the sampie mean of ~Yt over Set). From a ciassical
viewpoint as long as to<oo then
iimit Ilt = 11, almost surely
t-lOO
so there is no concern here with the issue of the convergence of the learning
process, as for example, found in Woodford (1990) and the references therein.
It turns out that an uncertain 11 fundamentally alters the qualitative
nature of uncertainty. To see this note that from 4), 8) and
the fact that 11 is independent of future shocks that:




rr2k + rr2k2/(t+t )
o
so that the posterior for Yt +k conditional on the information at t is:
10) Yt +k I S(t)"Po"rr
2





Comparing 10) with 5) we see that the conditional variance goes from being
O(k) when ~ is known to O(k2) when ~ is unknown. In particular for k > t+to
parameter uncertainty wi 11 dominate unknown future shocks as a source of
uncertainty about future income.
5Since the term
The fact that Vart[\+k1 is 0(k2) when I.l is unknown holds generally.
This can be seen by noting that if a series is growing at a rate I.l(t+k), that
the forecast error caused by Il being unknown for a k period horizon is (Il-Il)k
which has a variance Var[lllk2 in the Bayesiancase and Var[~lk2 in the
classical case. Different specifications of the stochastic process will only
alter the form of Var[lll or Var[lll so that for large enough k this dominates
the effects of unknown future shocks. (See Sampson 1991, 1993a and 1993b for
a fuller discussion of these issues).
That precautionary savings in the face of this greater uncertainty has
potentially large welfare implications for the agent Can be seen by
considering an agent without access to precautionary savings so that Ct=Yt (a
so-called Keynesian consumption function). In this case by combining 1) and
10) and using the fact that if X-N[Il,1T
2
] then E[exp(X)]=exP(Il+1T2/2), it
where:
A 2 o + a (Ilt-alT /2)
a2 2
__ IT __ > 0
2(t+t]
o
2 A2t' in 11) is positive, it must eventually dominate the term
-A1t, for large enough T. Thus
12) Limit V~(t ,T) -~
T_ 0
so that for long enough horizons the negative impact of parameter uncertainty
dominates all other factors influencing welfare.
Alternatively, the cost of uncertainty Can be measured by the amount of
consumption 7t (to'T) an agent would be willing to sacrifice in return for
6knowing that future income will be
T-t
U( Ct ).~oexp[-AltT + A2t.2]
or:
~t. with certainty. This is:
T-t
- i\(to,T) ] ~=oexP[-Alt·]
The same reasoning as above leads to the conclusion that:
14) Limit ~t(t ,Tl =
T_ 0
so that the welfare costs of an unknown M increase without bound if the agent
cannot or will not engage in precautionary savings. Thus there are
potentially very large incentives for agents to engage in precautionary
savings.
3. Precautionary Savings with Parameter Uncertainty:
r will now investigate the extent to which the use of precautionary
savings could avoid the· potentially large welfare costs associated with an
unknown ~. Suppose that the agent can borrow and save at a constant
real rate of interest so that wealth At evolves according to:
r 15) \ = e (At _l + Yt - l - Ct - l ) ,r
and where r is the real rate of interest. 1
~+I=O or alternatively:
> 0 A = 0 o
There is no bequest motive so that
1r use er rather than l+r for notational convenience. One can, however,
convert by simply replacing all occurrences of er with 1+r. Nothing depends
on this notational convention.
7Maximizing welfare at time t and assuming that r=o leads to the standard
Euler equation:
17) U' (Ct ) =Et [U' (Ct +1)] or
17') exp(-aCt) = Et [exP(-act +l )]
In the appendix it is shown that the general solution to 17) subject to the
income generating process 3),the posterior for future income 10) and the









2 [ 1 + ]/at +k+1(T).
t+t +k-l
o
Note that at(T), f3t (T) and 7t (to,T) are all positive.
From 18) it follows that savings St=Yt-Ct is:
22) St = -at(T) At - f3t (T) ~t + 7t (to,T)
so that 7t (to,T) determines the level of precautionary savings due to
uncertain future income for a given level of wealth and posterior mean ~t'
The value function Can by determined by using the law of iterated
expectations and the fact that the marginal utility of consumption is
proportional to the utility of consumption to obtain:
23) ~(to,T) = U(Ct)/at(T)
From 23) it follows that an alternative interpretation of 7t (to,T) is
8the welfare cost of uncertain future consumption. In particular at time t the
individual would be indifferent between his present random income process and
a deterministic income process of:
-r=O,l,2...T-t.
Thus 't(to' T) can be compared with 1\(to'T) in 13) to assess the relative
welfare costs of future income uncertainty with and without precautionary
savings.
Unlike the case where agents do not have access to precautionary
savings, the effect of uncertain future income on welfare is bounded as the
horizon T approaches infinity. This can be seen by inspecting 19), 20), and
21). As long as r > 0, the exponential discounting insures that the limits of
as !~ of ut (!), ~t(Tl and 't(to,Tl are all finite. These are given
respectively by:
2 al [ ]2[ ] elT /2 L -rk 1 + ~ 1 + 1
k=l e -'-t-:-+Tto-+-:-k"--- tH
o
+k-1
In particular since 't(tol < al the welfare costs of uncertain income are
finite with an infinite horizon even though they were infinite (i.e.
7 t (to,all = all when the agent did not have access to precautionary savings.
The reason for the sharp divergence in the effects of uncertainty on
welfare with and without precautionary savings is that precautionary savings
allows the agent to detach the consumption process from the highly uncertain
income process. With or without precautionary savings Vart [Yt+kl
Without precautionary savings Ct +k = Yt +k so that Vart[Ct+kl
and this then causes the infinite welfare loss when the horizon is infinite.
9However. with precautionary savings Vart[Ct+kl increases at a lower rate. In
the appendix I show that in this case Vart[Ct+kl is given by:2
k-l
Vart[Ct+kl = (2/S) [(er-l).L 't+j(to ) + 't(to)- 't+k(to) ).
J=o
Since 't(to) is decreasing in t:
Vart[Ct+kl ~ (2/S)(er-l)'t(to)(k+l).
and hence Vart[Ct+kl is O(k). Thus precautionary savings reduces the
uncertainty of future consumption to the same order of magnitude as when ~ is
known. 3
Since \+k = Ct +k + St+k and Vart[¥t+kl is O(k
2
), it follows that
Vart [St+kl = O(k2) so that precautionary savings shifts the higher order
O(k2) uncertainty from consumption to savings. From 22) and the fact that
~t+k is 0pO), it follows that Vart[\+kl is O(k
2
) as well so that wealth
shares the same order of uncertainty as savings.
4. Wealth Accumulation with an Infinite Horizon:
In this section of the paper I will investigate the implications of
parameter uncertainty for wealth accumulation. To simplify the calculations I
2Note that this expression is independent of ~t and hence is
deterministic and that
independent of S as well.
since is proportional to S, is
32· When ~ is known, it is shown below that 't(to)=,Bso- 12 and the O(k) result
then follows directly.
10wi 11 assume an infinite horizon. wi 11 first derive the wealth that an
individual of the generation having age t wi 11 have accumulated and then
aggregate over all generations.
From 18) with T=oo consumption for someone of generation t will be:
27) Ct = Yt + oc At + ~ ~t - 7t (to) ,
or, using 24) and St=Yt-Ct :
-r
27' ) At + St = e At - ~ ~t + 7t (to) .
Since At+1=er(At+St):
28) At +1-At = -~t/(l-e-r) + er7
t (toJ
and since A 0: o
28') At = - ~t/(l-e-r) + t[ (~-~t_k)/(l-e-r) + er7t_kCtO)] .
k=l
The term - ~t/C1-e-r) reflects the amount of wealth that would be accumulated
without any uncertainty. The two terms in the brackets of the summation in
28') capture the effect of uncertainty at time t-k on wealth at time t. The
first of these C~-~t_k)/C1-e-rJ reflects errors. made in the estimation of ~.
The second of these terms er7t_kCto) reflects the precautionary savings
motive at time t-k.
Note from either 28) or 28') that the effect of uncertainty on wealth
accumulation is permanent; that is, the effects of
r and e Tt_kCto) on future wealth do not diminish over time. Thus even
though the agent is learning and hence his uncertainty is diminishing.
there is no tendency for him to attempt to undo the effects of past errors or
savings decisions on his present level of wealth.
7t (to) reflects the two sources of uncertainty facing the agent: 1)
unknown future shocks to income and 2) the fact that ~ is unknown. It is
11possible to decompose 't(to) accordingly as:
where
2
30) '1 = ~e~ 12 > 0
reflects the uncertainty of unknown future shocks to income and
kt e-
rk
[ [ 1 +~~ ]2[
t+t +k
o
reflects the uncertainty stemming from ~ being unknown.
It also is possible to decompose wealth along similar lines. From 28')
and 29) and 30):
-t [~ - e~212]l(l-e-r)
t
+ erkb1'2t-k(tO)'
_ (- [ ~ _ -~]/(l-e-r) kh t k
so that the effect of unknown future shocks on wealth is to adjust the
effective ~ down by e~2/2.
I will now aggregate over individuals and generations in order to assess
the potential importance of an unknown ~ on aggregate wealth accumulation. I
will take it as given that wealth accumulation stemming from unknown future
shocks to income is significant, for example appealing to Caballero(1991) and
Skinner(l988) and their estimate that this can potentially account for 60
percent of US wealth. What I will attempt to do is measure the relative
importance of wealth accumulation due precautionary savings caused by ~ being
unknown to that caused by unknown future shocks to income. To do this without
getting bogged down in calibration exercises over too many dimensions, in
particular with respect to ~, ~, and e, I will make a number of simplifying
aggregation assumptions. These are:
12Aggregation Assumptions
Al. The population mean of ~ across generations and individuals is zero.
A2. The prior information that individuals possess is given by:
where ~2 and to is the same for all individuals. ~o may vary across
individuals but it is assumed to be an unbiased estimate of ~ in the
sense that across generations and individuals the population mean of
~o-~ is zero.
A3. The proportion of the population with age t is e-rt(l_e-rl.
A4. The number of individuals having age t is large enough to allow use
of the law of large numbers so that sample means and population means
are identical.
Al rules out the negative (positive) effect on aggregate wealth of a
positive (negative) population mean of ~. Caballero (1991) in his calibration
exercises also assumed that (the known value of) ~ is zero. Alternatively,
one can interpret the results below as being for wealth net of the effects
of any nonzero ~.
A2 can be thought of as assuming that the educational system provides
unbiased estimates of individual's skill levels and that the equivalent
number of work years that the educational system provides is the same for all
individuals. In addition all individuals have equally variable income.
A3 can be interpreted two ways. The first is that individuals live
forever but that the number of individuals born each period grows at a rate
of r each year so that r, in addition to being the discount rate and interest
13rate, is also the rate of population growth. Alternatively, each year the
same number of individuals are born but at each subsequent year they race a
constant probability of death of l-e-r " r. In this case each individual's
life expectancy is e-r/Cl-e-r ) " l/r.
Denote aggregate wealth by A and let A = Al + A 2 where Ai Is the level
of aggregate wealth that would be accumulated due to unknown future income
shocks if ~ were known, While A2 is the level of aggregate wealth that can be
attributed to uncertainty about ~.
From Ai and A4 we can for aggregate calculations set J!=O in 32). The
first term in 32) then yields wealth accumulated because of unknown future
shocks by individuals having age t. Using A3 to weight the contributions of
all generations then yields:
From A2 there is no systematic bias in prior beliefs. Since from 8")
the posterior mean is a weighted combination of the unbiased sample mean and
the prior mean, it follows that the there will be no bias across individuals
in the posterior mean or from A4J. the sample mean of ~t -~ across
individuals will be zero. Hence we can ignore the second term in 32) as far
as aggregate calculations are concerned.
From A2 the third term in 32) is identical for all individuals in
generation t since to and tr2 do not vary across individuals. Using A3 to
aggregate this term over all generations then yields:
2 r -r <Xl -rt t
34) A = e Cl-e ) le L72t_kCto).
t~ k=l
Reversing the order of the double summation and replacing the t index by t-k
and simpiifying then yields:














o 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Amount of Prior Information (Years)indicates that with an
Now, by substituting the deIinition of 72t(to) in 31), and replacing this
double sum over t and k by a single sum over t+k yields:
e-rk[ [ 1 + f3 ] 2 [1 + 1] _ 1 ]
k+to k+to
-l
Note that both Ai and A2 are proportional to acl/2 so that the relative
importance of the two is independent of a and ~2.
Define pet ,r) =A 2/A1 as the ratio of the two components of aggregate o
wealth which from 35) and 36) is:
e-rk[[ + f3 ]2 [1 + 1] _1].
k+to k+to
-1
The function p(to,r) is plotted in Diagram 1 with a solid line for
r=0.02 and a dashed line for r=0.05 for to ranging from 1 to 200 years. The
value of r=O.02 would imply a income .generating life expectancy of 50 years
and a population growth rate of 2 percent, which is about right for modern
developed economies. A value of r=0.05 may be more realistic for the real
rate of interest and the discount factor but would imply an income generating
life expectancy of only 20 years and a much too high 5 percent rate of
population growth.
As an example consider the possibility that agents enter the work force
at age 20 years having received an eqUivalent of 20 years working experience
from the educational system. Using t o=20 in Diagram
interest rate of two percent, wealth accumulated through precautionary
savings because of 1.1 being unknown wi 11 be 65 percent larger than wealth
accumulated because of unknown future shocks (1. e. p(20, O. 02)=1. 65. )
15Increasing the rate of interest to 5 percent lowers this so that the two
sources of wealth accumulatl'on are of about the same magnitude, in particular
p(20,O.05)=1.02. Hence in this case an unknown ~ is at least as important and
likely a more important determinant of aggregate wealth.
Let us now increase to by a factor of 10 so that the educational system
provides an equivalent of t o=200 years of working experience. In this
case from the calculations for Diagram 1 p(200,O.02) = 0.38 and p(200,O.05) =
0.18. Thus while unknown future shocks would be a more important source of
aggregate wealth accumulation, the effect of an unknown ~ would still be
economically significant.
In general p(to,r) decays slowly as to increases; in particular as to~:
38) p(to,r) = (2~+1)/to + 0(t~2).
Given this slow decay it would require fairly large values of to before
wealth accumulation due to an unknown ~ would be economically insignificant.
One could, for example, define insignificance as being less than 1 percent of
aggregate wealth due to unknown shocks or p(to,rJ,,;O.Ol.







which would require respectively to~lO,OOO years and to~4,OOO years.
4. Conclusions:
In this paper it has been shown that parameter uncertainty can be a
potentially important factor in explaining precautionary savings and wealth
accumulation. This is because parameter uncertainty increases by an order of
16magnitude the uncertainty of the income stream. Precautionary savings then
allows the household to transfer this higher order of uncertainty away from
consumption and into savings and hence insulates welfare from this higher
order of uncertainty. This would appear to make even more puzzling the
Carroll-Summers result that consumption often appears to closely follow
income over the life-cycle.
The quantitative nature of this effect depends crucially on the amount
of prior information agents have on ~ and it is difficult to say exactly how
this should be calibrated. Some idea of this could perhaps come from studies
of the predictive power of education and performance in the educational
system on future earnings growth.
Appendix:
1. Proof of 19) 20) and 21).
From the Euler equation 17') for t-l substitute 18) in for Ct to yield:
A.l) exp(-aCt _1) = Et _1[exp[-a
Et - 1[exp[-a
Yt + atAt + ~t~t - Tt)]]
Yt - 1+ AYt + ater(At_l+Yt_l-Ct_l)
+ ~t(~t-l + (AYt - ~t_l)/(t+to) - Tt)] ]
where the second equality follows Yt
= Yt - 1+ AYt , 8') and 15) and where I
suppress the dependence of the coefficients on t and T. Collect the terms o
which are in the information set and those which are not. The term not in the
information set will be
A.2) Et_l[eXP(-e(l+~t/(t+to))AYt)J
exp[-a0 +~t/( t+to ) )~t-l +(a
2.,.2/2) [[1+~t/(t+t0)] 2 [1+1/(t+t0-1)]]]
since "the distribution of AY
t
conditional on the information set at t-l is:
17t.YtIS(t-1l~PO~lT2 - N[ ~t-l' lT
2
[1+l/(t+to-ll]]
which follows from 10) with t replaced by t-l and k=l.
Using A.2) in A.l) and solving for Ct _1 then yields:







A.S) 7t - 1 =[7t + (elT2/2)(l+~t/(t+to))2(l+l/(t+to-l))]/(l+~ter).
From A.4) it follows that
-1 -r -1
A.7J ~t-l = e ~t + 1
so that using ~ = 1 and solving A.7) forwards results in 19). To obtain 20)
and 21) note that from A.4)
r -r
A.B) 1/(l+~te ) = e ~t-l/~t
so that if ~t= ~t/~t and 7t=7t/~t then A.5) and A.S) can be rewritten as:
- -r- -r -1
A.9) ~t-l = e ~t + e ~t
-r- -r 2 2
A.I0) 7t - 1 =e 7t +e (elT 12)(l+~t/(t+to)) (l+l/(t+to-l))/~t'
Again solving forwards and using ~T=7T =0 then yields, after some
straightforward manipulation, the required results.
From the Euler equation in 17') and the conditional normality of Ct +k it
follows that:
Et[exp(-act +k)) = exp(-eCt )
so that from the conditional normality of Ct +k it follows that:
18A.11) Vart[Ct+kl (218) Et[Ct +k - Ct]'
From 18) with T=oo:
A -r
Et[Ct +k - Ct ] = k /-It + (l-e ) Et[At +k - At] + 7t (to)- 7t +k(to)'
k-1
(er-I) L7t +j (to) + 7t (to)- 7t +k(to)
j=o
where the last equality follows from using 29) to evaluate Et[At +k - At]'
Hence Vart[Ct +k] is:
k-l
A.12) Vart[Ct +k] (218)[(er-1)j~o7t+j(to) + 7t (to)- 7t +k(to) ]
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